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In this article, we analyse the optimal investment decision in a new health care 
technology of a representative hospital that maximises its surplus in an uncertain 
environment. The new technology allows the hospital to increase the quality level of the 
care provided, but the investment is irreversible. The article uses the framework of the 
real option literature to show how the purchasing rules might influence the level of 
investment. We show that the investment in new technology is best incentivate within a 
long term contract where the number of treatments reimbursed depends on the level of 
investment made in the period when the technology is new. In this way, asymmetry of 
information does not affect the outcome of the contract. In our model in fact the 
purchaser can verify the level of the investment only at the end of each period but the 
purchasing rule has an anticipating effect on the decision to invest. 
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The design of contracts for health care is not straightforward due to the
peculiar characteristics of the product sold on this market which are well
known and will not be recalled here.
The quality of the care provided is one of the main issues because this
element, so important in determining the rate and speed of recovery of
the patients and the cost of the service is usually non-observable. The
health gain of each patient treated depends on the appropriateness of the
treatment, on the technology used, on the e⁄ort of the medical sta⁄ and
on some characteristics of the patient that are non observable. Even when
quality is observable, it would anyway be non contractible because the clause
would not be enforceable.1
Following Chalkley and Malcomson (2000), quality can be de￿ned as a
multivariable vector that includes all the aspects of medical care such as
appropriateness of the treatment, the investment in technology that bene￿t
to the recipients and other aspects that are not strictly medical, but that
can improve hospital￿ s stay. They are services such as the number of beds
per room, hours of visits, private telephones, nurses per ward, etc.
The literature so far has pointed out the existence of a trade o⁄between
the cost of the service, its quality, the ownership of the hospital and the
level of enforcement of the contract (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998, 2000
and 2002; Levaggi 2003a,b). Several models have been developed to show
the e⁄ects on the contract of uncertainty and asymmetry of information
(Levaggi, 1996, Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998 and 2000, Ma, 1994, Ellis,
1997). The common feature of these models is to assume that quality is a
running, unveri￿able cost, usually private information to the provider.
It is for this reason that most of the literature on contract setting in
health care points towards enhancing the level of competition to reduce
market power of the provider (Gravelle, 1999; Levaggi and Rochaix, 2003).
According to this point of view, the purchaser should shop around for the
provider that allows him to get the service with the best trade o⁄ between
cost and quality. Providers and patients competition would enhance the level
of quality of the service provided. However, this system seems to work only
for primary care. For hospital care Eintoven (2002) shows that the level of
competition, even in a private market like the US is quite low while Kessler
and McClellan (2000) show that competition might be socially wasteful.
1For the de￿ntion of observabale but nonveri￿able variables in contract theory see e.g.
La⁄ont and Martimort (2002).
2The reason for this apparent failure might depend on the intrinsic char-
acteristics of quality in hospital care. We argue that medical care is the main
determinant of quality which is in turn the result of an investment decision
in health care technology. Once the hospital has made a speci￿c quality
improving investment, the decision is irreversible, and the investment de-
termines the quality level of the health care produced by that provider for
the years to come. Our assumption is in line with the most recent literature
on new technology assessment which point out that technological changes
produced substantial improvement in prognosis for several ailments (Baker
and Phibbs, 2002, Medtap, 2004)
This assumption shifts the focus of the incentive compatible contract
from cost revelation to intertemporal investment decisions.
B￿s and De Fraja (2000) share some of our assumptions: quality is
assumed to be the result of an investment decision and it is irreversible. In
that paper, however, the intertemporal setting is not developed the authors
concentrate their analysis on the e⁄ects of non-contractability of quality.2
The intertemporal setting we develop allows us to capture another im-
portant feature of quality. Although the investment can be implemented at
any di⁄erent stage in the decision process, the technology is innovative only
at the beginning (￿rst period) of its life when learning costs are higher and
future operating costs to run the technology are not known. In subsequent
periods (second period) the technology is consolidated and the hospital that
has invested in the ￿rst period produces a positive externality to the system.
Most of the technological innovation in health care cannot be patented and
the hospitals that invest in the second period can use the innovation at a
lower cost. In this respect we model the investment in the ￿rst period as
mixed good that produces private and public bene￿ts.
Yet, the intertemporal setting allows us to follow the suggestion by
Palmer and Smith (2000) to use a real option approach in health technology
assessment and develops a full model in this direction.
On a formal level we develop a two-period partial equilibrium model ￿
la Abel et al. (1996) where the hospital is allowed to expand its capacity
by making an investment in health care technologies now or in the future.
This option has a value if future uncertainty has a su¢ ciently large downside
e⁄ect to make waiting a preferable action3. In this environment we study
2B￿s and De Fraja (2000) show that the hold up problem that emerges in this case may
be alleviated if the health authority arranges to purchase the service from other providers
other than the hospital.
3By analogy to ￿nancial options, it would be optimal for the hospital to delay exercising
its option and proceeds with the investment in quality due to the hope of gaining a higher
3the relationship between investment in quality and purchasing rules. The
principal ￿ndings of our paper can be summarised as follows:
a) Hospitals make substantial investment in new technology only if the are
o⁄ered long-term contracts (a two-period contract in our model); if
this is not the case, the investment in quality will be minimum and its
intertemporal allocation will mean that hospitals invest in a technology
only when this is a mature, well established technique;
b) The purchasing rule chosen for the long term contract determines the
timing of the investment in health care. In our model we make the
number of patients treated in the second period depend on the invest-
ment made in period one. This reduces (or cancels out) the option
value to delay the investment decision. This result, that derives from
the properties of the option models, has important policy implications
as the investment in quality can usually be observed (hence veri￿ed)
only ex post.4
c) The link between past levels of quality and the number of treatments
reimbursed usually makes hospital to increase future levels of quality,
our model shows instead that current levels are also incentivated, and
this result is very important since the investment is innovative only in
the ￿rst period of its implementation.
d) The adoption of the technology when it is new implies an higher cost
for patient treated so that the purchaser faces a trade o⁄ between
quality, technological content of the care provided and average cost of
provision.
The paper will be organized as follows: in the next section the features
of the model are presented, in section 3 the hospital￿ s investment decision
is presented; in section 4 we show how quality decision at time 1 vary with
the purchasing rule and ￿nally section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The traditional literature that deals with contracts for hospital health care
often assumes that quality is a variable cost which might be observable ex
payo⁄ in the future as uncertainty is resolved.
4The introduction of protocols for the treatment of speci￿c ailments allows to verify
ex post the appropriateness of the care o⁄ered such as the guides issued by NICE and
NCQA..
4post, but often it is not contractible.5. We argue that this way to model
quality might not re￿ ect its actual nature.
Quality is a multidimensional vector that includes hotel and medical
services. The ￿rst category de￿nes activities that are not strictly medical,
but that can improve hospital￿ s stay. They are services such as the num-
ber of beds per room, hours of visits, private telephones, nurses per ward,
etc. Medical activities improve the prognosis and the recovery process of
each admission. They include the technology used to treat the patient, the
appropriateness of the treatment o⁄ered and the motivation/e⁄ort of the
medical sta⁄ in taking care of the patient.
Hotel-related quality can be modelled as a variable cost, but the medical
dimension mainly derives from an investment decision. Both elements are
extremely relevant to determine patient￿ s utility, but in this paper we restrict
our de￿nition of quality to medical quality and we argue that this speci￿c
component depends on the investment in health technology made by the
provider.6 The investment is speci￿c, irreversible and determines the type
of treatment that can be supplied to the patient.
In this environment it follows that the decision of the hospital about the
level of quality to supply becomes an intertemporal decision and the type
of contract set by the purchaser (whether a spot or a long term one) is the
main variable that determines the quality level of the care to be provided.
The assumption that medical quality depends on an investment decision
has several e⁄ects on the way to approach the problem:
￿ contracts for health care have to be set in an intertemporal dimension;
￿ the trade o⁄ between the investment in quality, contract duration and
purchasing rule has to be made explicit.
￿ the intertemporal dimension of the contract makes the medical quaility
veri￿biable ex post.
The model deals with the investment choices of a representative hospital,
in a two-period framework as a proxy of long-term contracts, that is con-
fronted by a purchasing rule set up by the provider. In this paper we do not
make any speci￿c assumption about the objective of the purchaser which
might alternatively be a pro￿t maximizing insurance company, an HMO or
a benevolent health authority that wants to maximize the welfare of the
5See Chalckley and Malcomson (1998, 2000)
6In other words we assume that the treatment o⁄ered to the patient is always appro-
priate given the technology the hospital.
5patients through the supply of hospital care. We assume that the patient
has a limited choice in access to medical care, i.e. he can be admitted only
in the hospital that the purchaser has chosen.7
To simplify the analysis, it will be assumed that patients can be a⁄ected
only by one ailment that requires a standard treatment. The production
process is however uncertain due to productivity shocks deriving from per-
sonal characteristics of the patient or input prices. Health care is an input
into a process that leads to recovery. The personal ability of each individual
to take advantage of the treatment determines the quantity of resources to
be used. The price of the treatment might also vary because of a change in
the input prices, in the protocols or the guidelines set up for the treatment
of a particular ailment.
By the above arguments we introduce the following simplifying assump-
tions:
1. A new technology for producing health care is available at time 1 and
the hospital may decide the level of investment and its intertemporal
distribution. The investment in the new technology determines the
medical quality level so we use q for the level of investment and quality
as well. The current investment in quality is private information to
the hospital but the purchaser can verify it ex post.8
2. The number of patients needing treatment is independent of quality,
but the purchaser reimburses the hospital for the treatment of a num-
ber of patients x ￿ 0 which is ￿xed in the ￿rst period and may increase
in the second period if the hospital expand its investment in medical
quality. In other words, we assume that the health authority com-
mits to link the number of patients to treat in the second period to
the investment policy of the hospital using the following linear rule:
x2(q1;q2) ￿ x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2 ￿ q1) with ￿;￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿ (1)
where x is a ￿xed parameter, q1 and q2 is the stock of quality in the ￿rst
period and in the second period respectively, and ￿ and ￿ represent
the relative weight attached by the purchaser to the investment in
7This assumption can be justi￿ed on several grounds. In private health care systems
the insurance company o⁄ers the patient a list of hospitals to be admitted. In a public
health system the choice depends on the type of organisation, but it is usually limited
(Docteur and Oxley, 2003)
8i.e. that the purchaser observes the hospital quality ex post and may verify it before
a court (or a health regional o¢ ce).
6the two periods. If ￿ = ￿ the purchaser rewards the investment in
quality at a uniform rate; if ￿ = 0 the the hospital can increase its
activity level only if it invests in the second period; ￿nally, if ￿ = 0,
the number of patients treated in the second period depends only on
the investment at time t = 1.
3. Once the investment in the new technology is undertaken it cannot be
abandoned.9 Quality accumulation is given by q2 = q1+i2; where q1 is
the stock of quality invested in the ￿rst period, i2 denotes investment
in period 2 and depreciation is absent.
4. The hospital can invest in quality at unit cost r: In section 4.2 we deal
with the more general case in which the investment cost at time 2 is
lower than the investment cost a time 1, i.e. r2 < r1.
5. In addition to the investment cost, the hospital faces some operating
costs in running the new technology. These operating costs di⁄er from
period to period due to our assumption about the nature of the invest-
ment decision. In the ￿rst period the investment in new technology
has a multiplicative e⁄ect on the cost to produce health care. It com-
prises set-up costs such as learning cost and human capital formation.
Because of the investment in the new technology such costs are di-
rectly related to the size of the investment q rather than the number
of patients to be treated x. In the second period, the extra investment
in the same technology causes an increase in the cost due to pure rep-
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> > > > :
￿(q1)C1(x;￿1) for t = 1
C2(x2(q1;q2);￿2) 8 q2 ￿ q1 with q1 > 0
or
C2(x;￿2) 8 q2 ￿ 0 with q1 = 0
for t = 2
(2)
9Besides irreversiblity, this assumption avoids the need to consider such operating
options for the hospital as reducing output or even shutting down, and thereby considering
reducing variable costs. For further details see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
10As an example we might think about introducing laser theraphy to treat patients with
a speci￿c ailment. In the ￿rst period we will have to bear the cost of the equipment and
the cost related to teaching the sta⁄ how to use the new technology. In the second period
the purchase of another laser to treat the same ailment simply increases the cost due to
the increase in the number of cases treated.
7where ￿ 2 R is a parameter capturing productivity shocks as well
as the cost of factors of production other than quality investment.
We also add, ￿(0) = 1; ￿0(q1) > 0; ￿00(q1) < 0; with the regularity
conditions limq!0 ￿0(q) > 0 and limq!1 ￿0(q) = 0: We complete the
properties of the cost function assuming that is increasing and convex
in the number of patients Ct
xt;Ct
xtxt > 0; for t = 1;2 and we make the
following assumption on the costs of the hospital at t = 2:11
C2
x2x2￿ > 0; C2
x2x2 + x2C2
x2x2x2 < 0 (3)
Yet, if q1 = 0 the hospital may still invest in the new technology at
time 2 but without reputation bene￿ts, i.e. C2(x;￿2) for all q:
The cost function (2) allows the model to take account of another
important characteristic that the investment in medical quality has in
health care. This is the innovative content of the treatment o⁄ered.
In the ￿rst period the technology is innovative and requires higher
operating setting up costs which are in part a positive externality
on the rest of the scienti￿c community. In the second period the
new technology has become established and by making its investment
in this period the hospital gains from the positive externality and
may have lower operative costs. Finally, without loss of generality, we
assume in the paper that C1 = C2 = C:12
6. The hospital receives a payment per treatment pt that is equal to
the marginal cost Ct
xt(xt;qt;￿t); t = 1;2 in exchange for the service
delivered. The cost reimbursement scheme and the link (1) de￿ne our
purchasing rule. The hospital￿ s surplus function can be written as:
Ut(qt;xt;￿t) ￿ xtpt￿Ct(xt;qt;￿t) = xtCt
xt(xt;qt;￿t)￿Ct(xt;qt;￿t) t = 1;2
(4)
7. Finally, we introduce uncertainty in the model through the productiv-
ity shock ￿. We assume that ￿1 is known and normalized to 1 while
11Note that an increase in q2 determines an increase of the marginal costs Cx2x2; plus
the reduction in the revenue obtained from the infra-marginal patients x2Cx2x2x2: The
condition (3) assures that the latter overweight the former. Such a assumption is consistent
with even simple cost functions. For example let C = (k ￿ x)
￿" where " and k are
paramters. Then the above assumption is satis￿ed for a variatry of parameter values
including " = 2 and k=3 ￿ x < k:.




8￿2 ￿ ￿ is stochastic and its realization is characterized by the cumu-
lative distribution ￿(￿) with density ￿0(￿) > 0 on ￿ 2 [0;1), which
is obseved by the hospital and the purchaser.13
3 The hospital￿ s investment decision
We consider the hospital￿ s decision to investment in health care technol-
ogy in a two-period framework ￿ la Abel et al.(1996). If in period 1 the
hospital makes an investment that it cannot resell in period 2 and future
capital returns are uncertain, this investment decision involves the exercise
of an option. Because of the uncertainty, the opportunity to wait to learn
more about the future hospital￿ s productivity level has a timing premium
or holding value.
The role of ￿ deserves some further explanations. The productivity shock
can be observed by the hospital only at the beginning of each period and
becomes public information. Given the marginal cost pricing rule we have
assumed, the hospital bear no risk on the running cost. However, since q2
depends on ￿2 also q1 is a⁄ected by its realization and in this respect it
introduces uncertainty in our model.
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows. At the beginning
of period 1, the health authority announces x; the number of patients to
treat in the ￿rst period and the purchasing rule for the second period. The
hospital, knowing ￿1 and the purchasing rule, decides q1. At the beginning
of period 2, q1 becomes veria￿able, nature reveals ￿2 and, conditional on q1,
the hospital chooses q2:
1 2
￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿
The authority set Nature The hospital Nature The hospital
the contract reveals ￿1 chooses q1 reveals ￿2 chooses q2
We start by describing the hospital￿ s action in the second period, given
the stock of quality q1 inherited from period 1. We then step back and show
how the marginal pro￿tability in the ￿rst period depends on the hospital￿ s
expected action in the second period.
13As in B￿s and De Fraja (2000), we assume that there is symmetry of information
about the technology.
93.1 Second period
By assumptions 2, 5 and 6, the hospital￿ s surplus at time 2 can be written
as:
U2(q2;q1;x;￿) ￿ x2(q1;q2)Cx2(x2(q1;q2);￿) ￿ C(x2(q1;q2);￿)
yet the same assumptions guarantee that U2
q2(q2;q1;x;￿) ￿ 0 is continuous
and strictly decreasing in q and continuous and strictly increasing in ￿ (see
Appendix A): Then, for a given stock of q1 inherited from period 1, we can
de￿ne a critical values of ￿:14
U2
q2(q1;x;￿￿) ￿ ￿(x + ￿q1)Cx2x2(x + ￿q1;￿￿) = r (5)
At the beginning of period 2, nature reveals ￿ and the hospital will adjust its
stock of medical quality to the new optimal level that we identify as q2(￿):
The stock of quality must satisfy the constraint:
q2(￿) ￿ q1 (6)
Thus, depending on the inherited stock q1; from (5) we obtain that when
￿ > ￿￿(q1;￿) it is optimal for the hospital to invest in extra quality up
to the point where the marginal return from quality equals the marginal
investment cost (purchasing price) r: On the other hand, when ￿ < ￿￿(q1;￿)
the pro￿tability is so low that the ￿rm ￿nds it convenient not to invest, so
q2(￿) = q1: Finally, by (2), if q1 = 0 the surplus of the hospital at time 2 is
always constant and then q2(￿) = 0 for all values of ￿.
3.2 First period
From (4) and (16), the following Lemma holds:














2[Cx2x2 + (x + ￿q1)Cx2x2x2]
￿(x + ￿q1)Cx2x2￿
> 0
10Lemma 1 The value of the hospital￿ s investment in medical quality, de￿ned
as the expected present value of net cash ￿ow accruing to the hospital when
the stock of quality in period 1 is q1; is given by the following expression:











f[(x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2(￿) ￿ q1))Cx2((x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2(￿) ￿ q1));￿)
￿C((x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2(￿) ￿ q1));￿)] ￿ r[q2(￿) ￿ q1] gd￿(￿)g
where ￿ is the discount factor.
Proof. See Appendix A
Hence, the ￿rst period decision problem is simply given by:
q1 = argmax[V (q1;x) ￿ rq1]: (8)


















1 the stock of medical quality that the hospital would purchase
in a short-term contract (i.e. U1
q1(qs:t:
1 ;x) ￿ ￿0(qs:t:
1 )[xCx(x)￿C(x)] = r); we
can write the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A long-term contract increases the investment in period 1:
Vq1(q1;x) > U1
q1(q1;x) ) q1 > qs:t:
1
11Proof. See Appendix B
This result has important policy implications: in order to increase the
level of investment in new health technology, a long term contract has to
be set. The long term arrangement is a reward the hospital receives for the
positive externality created by the use of the new technology at an early
stage. This creates a trade o⁄ between competition and incentives to invest
in new technology. Competition is enhanced by short run agreements that
allow the purchaser to choose each period the provider o⁄ering the lowest
price. However, if quality depends on an irreversible investment decision,
this policy would lead to low quality level. This might be the reason why
competition in the health care market is not as high as one might expect
(Eintoven, 2002; 2004). This result is in line with the recent literature that
suggests that the use of long term contracts reduces the hold up problem
(Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000; Chung, 1991; Aghion at al.,1994).
Furthermore, since q1 and hence ￿￿(q1;￿) are ex post ver￿able, the ￿rst
order condition (9) is also consistent with the assumption of nonveri￿abil-
ity of the quality at time 2. This property comes from the application of
the principle of optimality of the dynamic programming. The optimality
principle says that an optimal quality-path has the property that, given the
initial conditions and control values over an initial period, the control over
the remaining periods must be optimal for the remaining problem, with
the state variable resulting from the early decisions considered in the initial
condition (Dixit, 1990, pp. 164-166). Formally this implies ￿nding a state
contingent function q2(￿) such that the hospital chooses the quality at time
1 by equating Vq1(q1;x) to r. Suppose now that the hospital, expecting to
report at t = 2 a higher value of investment, chooses at time 1 ~ q2(￿); with
~ q2(￿) > q2(￿) for all ￿ > ￿￿. This cannot be an optimal decision. In fact,
since Vq1~ q2(q1;x) < 0; the hospital can do better by choosing ~ q2(￿) = q2(￿):
the pro￿t ￿ ow that the ￿rm expects to obtain following the policy q2(￿) is
the best that it can do, at least till t = 2:15
15In addition, since at time 2 the purchaser observes and veri￿es q1 (￿
￿); it is always able
to infer q2(￿) directly from (9) (i.e. q2(￿) is uniquely determined by U
2
q2(q2(￿);q1;x;￿) =
r). This makes the second period a pure nonver￿abilility model, i.e. even though the
revelation of ￿ makes q2 common knowledge between the purchaser and the provider,
it cannot be enforced by a third party. To achieve the ￿rst best allocation a Nash
implementation mechanism is needed. La⁄ont and Martimort (2002), for example, show
that the simple incentive compatible contracts used in the adverse selection context with
ex ante contracting, perform quite well in the case of nonver￿ability and risk neutrality of
the hospital. This is, however, beyond the scope of the this paper.
123.3 Analysis of some special cases
A long term contract can be written in several ways. In our approach we
have used the following rule:
x2(q1;q2) = x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2 ￿ q1) with ￿;￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿
Three are three cases which is instructive to examine. First, if ￿ = ￿
the purchasing rule becomes x2 = x + ￿q2. According to the condition
U2
q2(q2(￿);q1;x;￿) = r the necessary condition for a maximum (9) becomes:
Vq1(q1;x;￿ = ￿)






￿(x + ￿q1)Cx2x2((x + ￿q1);￿)d￿(￿) (10)
+r(1 ￿ ￿(￿￿)g















where ￿￿ is given by (5) under ￿ = ￿:
Second, if ￿ = 0 the purchasing rule becomes x2 = x+￿(q2 ￿q1); which
makes the surplus U2(x;￿) independent from q at q2 = q1: The hospital￿ s
investment in the second period i2 no longer depends on q1. Thus, the
condition (9) simply reduces to a static optimization:
Vq1(q1;x;￿ = 0) ￿ ￿0(q1)[xCx(x) ￿ C(x)] = r: (11)
13Third, if ￿ = 0 the purchasing rule reduces to x2 = x + ￿q1: In this
case, for any given stock of q1 inherited from period 1, the surplus at t = 2















Finally, as by assumption 5, U1
q1(q1;x) ￿ 0 is continuous and strictly de-
creasing in q with limq1!1 U1
q1(q1;x) = 0; we may conclude this section
noting that qs:t:
1 is strictly positive, which implies also that:
Corollary 1 q1 and q2 ￿ q1 are strictly positive.
Proof. Straightforward from proposition 1.
4 Analysis of the results and policy implications
4.1 The trade o⁄ between investment and purchasing rule
We begin analyzing the e⁄ect of a change in the rule that links the number
of patients to treat to the investment in quality by comparing the three
cases presented above. For better understanding of the role played by the
purchasing rule on the hospital￿ s investment decision, let us use the option
decomposition of (7) proposed by Abel et al.(1996). That is:
Lemma 2 The value of the hospital￿ s investment can be written as:









f￿[(x2(q1;q2(￿))Cx2(x2(q1;q2(￿));￿) ￿ C(x2(q1;q2(￿));￿)) ￿ rq2(￿)]
+ [((x + ￿q1)Cx2((x + ￿q1);￿) ￿ C((x + ￿q1);￿)) ￿ rq1]gd￿(￿)
Proof. See Appendix C
The term G(q1;x) is the hospital￿ s expected present value of returns
during the contract keeping the stock of medical quality ￿xed at q1: This can
be interpreted as the hospital￿ s value when it does not expand its investment
in the second period. The term O(q1;x) indicates the value of the (call)
option to expand in the second period if pro￿tability rises above ￿￿:Equation
(13) has then an interesting and immediate interpretation: when the hospital
invests in period 1 it gets the value G(q1;x) but gives up the opportunity
or option to invest in the future, valued at O(q1;x):
Similarly as in (9), the optimal amount of quality in period 1, depends
on a comparison between marginal bene￿ts and marginal costs:











[￿(x + ￿q1)Cx2x2((x + ￿q1);￿) ￿ r]d￿(￿) ￿ 0
Equation (14) emphasizes the role played by the option pricing approach
in determining the optimal stock of investment in period 1. The hospital￿ s
optimal behaviour does not simply equalize the expected present value of
marginal returns in the ￿rst period (Gq1(q1;x)) and the marginal cost of the
investment r: Costs are represented by the purchase price of the investment,
r; plus the value of the marginal call option, Oq1(q1;x); as investing in period
1 gives up the opportunity to delay the investment.
De￿ning q1(￿ = ￿); q1(￿ = 0) and q1(￿ = 0)the stock of quality that
the hospital would install under the three cases examined in the previous
section , we can prove the following proposition:
15Proposition 2 The investment in period 1 can be ranked as follows:
q1(￿ = 0) = qs:r:
1 < q1(￿ = ￿) < q1(￿ = 0)
Proof. See Appendix D
The last proposition can be interpreted as follows: the policy of incen-
tivating the investment in the technology only when it is no longer new
(￿ = 0) gets the same result as a short run contract which, being more
￿ exible should then be preferred. A uniform incentive in investing in qual-
ity (￿ = ￿) gives a better incentive than a short term contract, but the
most e⁄ective policy is perfect discrimination (￿ = 0): the last rules in fact
implies that the hospital has the maximum incentive to invest in quality
when the purchasing rule implies that only the investment made in the ￿rst
period enters in the decision of the number of patients to send to a speci￿c
hospital. That is, setting ￿ = 0 washes out the option value of delay held
by the hospital.16
In the latter case the purchaser gives in fact a sort of patent to the hos-
pital that has ￿rst invested in the new technology. The number of patients
that can be treated depends in fact only on the level of investment made in
the ￿rst period and those who will invest in later periods will not see any
increase in the number of case they might treat.
This result has important policy implications: even if the level of invest-
ment can be observed ex post, asymmetry of information can be ruled out
of the system. When the contract is signed, the purchaser cannot observe
the level of investment in health technology, but he will be able to do so
before implementing the relevant part of the contract. In our model this is a
su¢ cient deterrent not to cheat on the level of investment in the ￿rst period.
In the second period the issue becomes irrelevant since the new investment
is not considered in the decision of how many patients to send to a speci￿c
hospital.
Finally, we further investigate the e⁄ect of a change in the purchasing







This expression must be evaluated at the maximum of the hospital￿ s in-
vestment choice, that is at the point in which Vq1(q1;x) ￿ r = 0: Since at
16It is also worth noting that the extreme result of zero investment in the second period
when ￿ = 0 is only due to our two-period horizon setting.
16this point Vq1q1(q1;x) < 0 by the second order condition, the sign of (15) is




f￿(q2(￿) ￿ q1)[Cx2x2 + (x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2(￿) ￿ q1))Cx2x2x2]+







@￿ is generally positive, the slope of the relationships between q1 and
￿ turns out to be negative, i.e.
dq1
d￿ < 0.17 Then, by continuity, for a given
value of the parameter ￿; any increases of the number of patients driven
by the investment in quality in the second period reduces investment in the
￿rst period over the range (q1(￿ = ￿);q1(￿ = 0)).
4.2 The trade o⁄ between quality and investment cost
So far we have assumed that r2 = r1 = r: However the cost of many health
care technologies face a decreasing cost as time goes by. A good example is
MR scanners whose cost for a ￿xed technological level is decreasing through
time. This can be done by simply assuming that r2 = (1￿￿)r with 0 < ￿ < 1
and substituting it into the equation (14). Direct inspection shows that ￿






[￿(x + ￿q1)Cx2x2((x + ￿q1);￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)r]d￿(￿) ￿ 0
where ￿￿ is evaluated by (5) taking account of the lower cost (1￿￿)r. The
derivative of Oq1 with respect to ￿ gives:
17To be precise, for any given ￿ > ￿





x2x2(x2(q1;q2);￿) = r; (16)














As it is evident the sign of (17) is generally positive except for value of ￿ close to ￿













@￿ < 0; we may conclude (see ￿gure):









Proof. Straightforward from (14), (18) and proposition 2.
The second part of corollary follows from the fact that ￿ = 0 eliminates
the option value to delay the investment by the hospital and for this reason
there is no advantage in waiting to invest.
4.3 The trade o⁄ between price and quality
Finally in this section we show the trade o⁄that exists between the price for
health care and its technological content. We focus on the cost for health
care in the ￿rst period when the technology is new. If the purchaser does
not want to commit itself to a long term contract in order to increase the
level of competition in health care, it will get a minimum quality level and
a correlated cost equal to:
ps:r:
1 = Cx(x;qs:r:
1 ) ￿ ￿(qs:r:
1 )Cx(x)
B￿s and De Fraja (2000) and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) suggest to
improve on this contract by making the number of patients treated depend






1 is given by (9) As long as q1 > qs:r:
1 direct inspection gives p1 > ps:r:
1 ;
and the positive relationship between quality and patient treated, shows
that:
18Corollary 3 If the purchaser wants to make available to the community





Proof. Straightforward from proposition 2.
This shows the trade o⁄ between quality and the price for health care.
The level of technological investment to be made will then depend on the
willingness to pay of the community for innovation in health technology.
Furthermore, although our model deals only with a representative hospi-
tal, the above result may help to say something about the e⁄ect of competi-
tion on the investment decision: ￿ can in fact be interpreted as a measure of
intertemporal competition among hospitals.The result of corollary 2 is due
to the combined e⁄ect of the incentive to invest in the ￿rst period and to
the reduced level of competition in the second period. To show this, let us
consider the case in which ￿ = 0: The hospitals that have invested in the
technology at time 1 have a sort of monopoly power since all the competi-
tors will not receive extra patients at time 2 for the speci￿c technology even
if they have invested in it. For 0 < ￿ < ￿; the tecnology is rewarded, but
there is still a preference towards the hospitals that have invested in the ￿rst
period. Finally, for ￿ = ￿ there is no competitive advantage in period two
since the investment in the speci￿c technnology is rewared at the same rate,
independently of its intertemporal distribution.18
5 Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between purchasing rules and med-
ical quality when quality depends on an irreversible investment decision.
The level of investment is observable ex post while costs are subject to un-
certainty. We concentrate on the response of a representative hospital to
di⁄erent purchasing rules set by the purchaser. The hospital is a surplus
maximizing unit that has to take decision in a two period model in a con-
text of uncertainty and asymmetry of information. Uncertainty has several
dimensions that relates to the cost of provision and to the innovation process
while asymmetry of information derives the observation of quality of health
care only ex post.
18Note, however, that as long as q2 is not veri￿able, the hospitals may claim a higher
q2 to obtain a higher payment per treatment at t = 2, see footnote 15.
19We de￿ne quality as an investment decision in health technology that
produces in the ￿rst period of its application a positive externality. The
investment is in fact assumed to be innovative only in the ￿rst period if
its application when costs are higher due to the learning process. In the
following period the hospital faces only set up and/or expanding costs.
We show that a trade o⁄exists between the duration of the contract and
quality. In particular a one period-short term contract is not e⁄ective in
promoting investments in innovative technology, as one might expect.
The purchasing rule chosen is also very important. We show that the
most e⁄ective incentive to invest in new technology is to make the number of
patients to be treated by an hospital depend only on the level of investment
in the ￿rst period.
In this case the purchaser gives a sort of patent to the hospital that has
￿rst invested in the new technology since those who will invest in later pe-
riods will not see any increase in the number of case they might treat. This
patent is able to canceled out the hospital￿ s option value to delay the invest-
ment. This policy can be applied only in a context where patients￿ choice
is ruled out. If patients could choose where to go, the purchaser would not
be able to control the ￿ ow of patients going to di⁄erent hospitals and the
incentive to invest might be reduced. This consideration opens up the dis-
cussion on another topical theme in health economics, i.e. patients￿choice
and its consequences on the system. From this analysis it seems that a trade
o⁄ might exists between the level of investment and patients￿choices, but
these e⁄ects should be explored further.
Several other extension can be proposed. In our paper the purchaser
does not play an active role: the further logical step in our analysis would
be to de￿ne an objective function for the purchaser and to ￿nd the optimal
contract in this environment. The e⁄ect of di⁄erent pricing rules could also
be studied. In our model we in fact assume that the provider is reimbursed
using a marginal cost pricing rule, but in health care prospective, mixed
and incentive compatible payment systems are also used.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Let ￿rst describe the properties of the hospital￿ s surplus function (4). From
(1), (2), (3) and (4), easy computation shows that at t = 1 we get:
U1(q1;x) ￿ ￿(q1)[xCx(x) ￿ C(x)] > 0; (19)
20with the properties:
U1
q1(q1;x) ￿ ￿0(q1)[xCx(x) ￿ C(x)] > 0; (20)
U1
q1q1(q1;x) ￿ ￿00(q1)[xCx(x) ￿ C(x)] < 0: (21)
At t = 2; the hospital￿ s surplus is:
U2(q2;q1;x;￿) ￿ x2(q1;q2)Cx2(x2(q1;q2);￿) ￿ C(x2(q1;q2);￿); (22)
with x2(q1;q2) ￿ x + ￿q1 + ￿(q2 ￿ q1) and the properties:
U2
q2 ￿ ￿x2(q1;q2)Cx2x2(x2(q1;q2);￿) > 0; (23)
U2





￿(x + ￿q1)Cx2x2((x + ￿q1);￿) > 0 for q2 = q1





￿2[Cx2x2 + (x + ￿q1)Cx2x2x2] < 0 for q2 = q1
(￿ ￿ ￿)2[Cx2x2 + x2(q1;q2)Cx2x2x2] ￿ 0 q2 > q1
(26)
Note that an increase in q2 determines an increase of the marginal costs
Cx2x2; plus the reduction in the revenue obtained from the infra-marginal
patients x2Cx2x2x2: Condition (3) assures that the latter overweights the
former. Finally:
U2
q2￿ ￿ ￿(x2(q1;q2))Cx2x2￿(x2(q1;q2);￿) > 0 (27)
Since the value of the hospital￿ s investment is:














direct substitution of (19) and (22), we obtain (7) in the text.
21B Proof of proposition 1




























As, by de￿nition U2






































































there exists, for any given value of r, a unique value of q1 satisfying equation
(30). This prove the proposition.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Easy computation shows that (28) can be written as:







f￿[U2(q2(￿);q1;x;￿) ￿ rq2(￿)] + [U2(q1;x;￿) ￿ rq1]gd￿(￿):
Then, de￿ning:







f￿[U2(q2(￿);q1;x;￿) ￿ rq2(￿)] + [U2(q1;x;￿) ￿ rq1]gd￿(￿)
and substituting (19) and (22), we obtain the expression in the text.
23D Proof of proposition 2
First of all direct inspection of (7) and (13) shows that Gq1(q1;x) = Vq1(q1;x;￿ =
0): Second, comparing (10) with (14) con￿rms that Vq1(q1;x;￿ = ￿) =
Gq1(q1;x) ￿ ￿Oq1(q1;x); which implies that q1(￿ = ￿) < q1(￿ = 0): Third,
as Vq1(q1;x;￿ = 0) < Vq1(q1;x;￿ = ￿) we get the ￿rst part of the inequality.
This conclude the proof of the proposition.
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